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FREE SPEECH AND OBEDIENCE TO LAW 
Frederick Schauer* 
I. 
Several generations ago Alexander Meiklejohn asserted that 
among the virtues of a regime of freedom of speech was its 
connection with the obligation to obey the law.1 More specifically, 
Meiklejohn maintained not only that the right to voice 
disagreements with laws was a morally and politically necessary 
condition of compelling people to obey laws with which they 
disagreed, but seemed to imply as well that people would in fact 
be more inclined to obey those laws when they were given the 
opportunity to object than would be the case were their dissenting 
voices to be stifled by official action. 
The relationship between democratic legitimacy and 
freedom of speech has subsequently been the subject of analyses 
offered by Ronald Dworkin,2 by Robert Post,3 and, most recently, 
by James Weinstein in this Symposium4 and elsewhere.5 
Weinstein in particular advances our understanding of the issue 
by drawing on the venerable distinction between normative 
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 1. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 10–11 (1948). See also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 100 (1960). 
 2. RONALD DWORKIN, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY vii 
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009). Dworkin’s views on democratic legitimacy are 
elaborated in JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011). 
 3. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2014); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, 
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 280–88 (1995); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of 
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (2000). 
 4. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017). 
 5. James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2011). 
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legitimacy and descriptive (or sociological) legitimacy.6 
Normative legitimacy is a process-based philosophical idea,7 and 
designates or describes those forms of governmental organization 
and governmental action that are right, or just, as matter of 
political philosophy. The idea is normative and not empirical, and 
a government or its actions are legitimate insofar as they are 
democratic, or egalitarian, or deliberative, or in some other way 
built on normatively desirable foundations. More specifically, 
normative legitimacy typically is taken as referring to the 
conditions permitting the political state to justifiably demand 
obedience from its citizens, and thus to impose its laws on those 
who refuse to obey.8 
If we understand normative legitimacy as a fundamentally 
non-consequentialist and non-instrumental idea, and if we 
understand it as focused primarily on procedure in the broadest 
sense of that word, then we can say that a normatively desirable 
form of governmental organization is to be preferred independent 
of the value of the consequences that may flow from adopting it. 
We might believe, for example, that majoritarian democracy is a 
good in itself, and that it has moral merits as a form of decision-
making independent of whether it produces better policies, or 
more citizen happiness, or more truth, or anything else.9 And thus 
we might believe, as Weinstein plainly does believe, that allowing 
 
 6. An excellent overview of the issues and the literature is Fabienne Peter, Politcal 
Legitimacy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/legitimacy (2016). See also THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING 
PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS (John T. Jost & 
Brenda Major eds., 2001). In the legal literature, valuable contributions include Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005); Michael L. 
Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1011 (2007). 
 7. I say “process-based” to distinguish a notion of legitimacy that is largely or 
entirely dependent on the substantive rightness of an outcome (see, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, 
JUDGING JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 75-
103 (1980)) from a notion that focuses on the way in which outcomes are generated. 
Because it is not clear that the former notion adds anything to the idea of substantive 
rightness (or justice), I understand legitimacy to refer to the way in which outcomes are 
produced, thus leaving conceptual (and empirical) space for legitimately produced but 
substantively wrong outcomes. 
 8. See STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 105 (3d ed. 2013); Tom R. Tyler, 
Psychology and the Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 711, 716–
17 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008). 
 9. On the distinction between the instrumentally and the intrinsically valuable as 
arguments for democratic decision-making (and, implicitly, for any other form of 
governmental organization), see WILLIAM N. NELSON, ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY 
(1980). 
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people to object to policies with which they disagree is a necessary 
component of normative legitimacy, and thus of the warrant of 
the state to enforce its directives by coercive means. From this 
perspective, normative legitimacy stands in no need of 
consequential, instrumental, or empirical justification. It is simply 
a matter of first-order political morality. In offering this claim, 
Weinstein seems largely correct, even though it might be plausible 
to argue that a democracy exists when people have the right to 
vote for their representatives, or have the right to vote on matters 
of policy, and that, especially in a representative rather than direct 
democracy, the right of the citizen to speak out is not a necessary 
condition of democratic legitimacy itself as long as the citizen can 
be part of choosing those who will represent her.10 
Although there are substantial difficulties with treating 
representation as a sufficient condition for either democracy or 
legitimacy, I mention that position here only to highlight the fact 
that tying freedom of speech to normative legitimacy needs some 
argument, and that a strong and continuous right to freedom of 
speech is not entailed by the very idea of democracy, at least as 
long as the idea of representative democracy is not an oxymoron. 
Still, it seems difficult to imagine a process of selecting 
representatives or policies that is not crucially facilitated by direct 
citizen speech, and it seems even more difficult to imagine 
government by the people that does not permit those people to 
participate in policy-making outside of the episodic process of 
voting.11 As a result, the connection between freedom of 
 
 10. Of some relevance here is the distinction between trustee and delegate models of 
representation. See SUZANNE DOVI, THE GOOD REPRESENTATATIVE (2007); HANNA 
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking 
Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515 (2003). Under a delegate model, 
representatives are expected to represent the actual wishes of their constituents, but under 
a trustee model the representative is to advance her constituents’ best interests, 
independent of their actual expressed wishes, just as the trustee of an estate should aim to 
maximize the value of the estate in the interest of the beneficiaries but need not take 
instructions from the beneficiaries as to how to do so. The value of freedom of citizen 
communication outside of the electoral process is thus more closely connected with a 
delegate than a trustee model, and arguments for free speech founded on continuous 
communication between citizens and their representatives thus implicitly incorporate 
much of the delegate model of representation. See Frederick Schauer, Constitutions of 
Hope and Fear, 124 YALE L.J. 528 (2014) (book review). 
 11. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 241-
43 (1995). 
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(political12) speech and democratic decision-making emerges as a 
close one, entailed by a wide range of views about simply what it 
is governmental decisions to be made by as well as for the 
citizenry. Insofar as democracy is itself desirable, therefore, its 
components are necessarily so, and thus the argument is not so 
much that freedom of speech is a consequence of democracy or a 
facilitator of democracy as it is that freedom of speech is arguably 
simply part of the definition of what democracy and democratic 
legitimacy just are. It is not clear to me that translating this basic 
proposition of normative political philosophy into the language of 
“legitimacy” adds very much, but this is largely a terminological 
quibble. The basic point, regardless of the language we use to 
describe it, is that freedom of political speech is normatively 
justifiable as a necessary component of a normatively justifiable 
form of governance in which citizens have substantial input by 
voting and otherwise into the decisions that will affect them and 
that will control their activities. 
II. 
Although both this Symposium and much of the discussion 
of legitimacy takes place in the context of debates over laws 
prohibiting so-called hate speech, I will say very little about hate 
speech here. Rather, I will address more generally a range of 
issues that are (contingently) implicated by some of the issues in 
the hate speech debate, but my focus will be on the general issues 
and not on hate speech. One reason for skirting the hate speech 
controversy is that the issues of legitimacy, and of the relationship 
between freedom of speech and political legitimacy, are far 
broader than the question of hate speech in particular. But 
 
 12. For Meiklejohn, the argument for freedom of speech as a consequence of 
compelling people to obey governmental decisions with which they disagree produced the 
conclusion that only political speech – speech directed to questions of governmental 
organization or policy – was protected by the First Amendment. Meiklejohn, supra note 1. 
See also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245; A considerable amount of subsequent commentary has engaged with Meiklejohn on 
this question, often arguing that a great deal of art and literature, among other topics and 
genres, is also relevant to public policy, causing Meiklejohn’s distinction between the 
political and the personal to collapse. See, e.g., Harry Kelven, Jr., The New York Times 
Case: A Note on the “Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191; 
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990). 
This is an interesting and important debate, but its relevance to the relationship between 
legitimacy and obedience is at best tangential, and so I will do no more than note it here. 
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although the issue of hate speech is but one instantiation of the 
topic of free speech generally and of free speech and legitimacy 
more particularly, the hate speech question has both a high degree 
of political salience and a substantial amount of ideological 
valence. Consequently there exists some risk that the analysis of 
interesting and important questions about the relationship 
between political legitimacy and freedom of speech will be both 
crowded out and distorted by discussing them in the context of the 
contentious subject of hate speech. We know from the literature 
on the availability heuristic that that which is most salient may 
distort our appreciation of the full range of issues that some 
principle or decision may encompass,13 and we know from the 
research on motivated reasoning that an antecedent preference 
for a an outcome may influence the analysis of the considerations 
that would lead to accepting or rejecting that outcome.14 
Accordingly, it seems preferable to discuss the broader 
philosophical and empirical questions about free speech and 
legitimacy in a discursive environment in which the participating 
discussants have few ideological or political priors, or at least are 
thinking about a wide range of applications, but the hate speech 
debate is decidedly not such an environment. And thus because I 
find the issue of the relationship between freedom of speech and 
political legitimacy independently important and interesting, I 
prefer to avoid rather than embrace, at least here, the distractions 
of the hate speech controversy.15 
In addition, discussions of hate speech necessarily 
presuppose empirical as well as philosophical questions about the 
consequences of such speech. Tellingly, Dworkin, Weinstein, and 
 
 13. The seminal source on the availability heuristic is Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COG. 
PSYCH. 207 (1973). See also SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, The Availability Bias in Social 
Perception and Interaction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES 190 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
 14. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 489 
(1990). See also Peter H. Ditto et al., Motivated Moral Reasoning, 50 PSYCH. LEARNING & 
MOTIVATION 307 (2009); Keith E. Stanovich et al., Myside Bias, Rational Thinking, and 
Intelligence, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 259 (2013). 
 15. My reluctance to situate the legitimacy question within the concrete, 
controversial, political, and highly salient questions about hate speech is also part of a 
larger concern about the risks of making (or arguing about) general policies or general 
principles in the looming shadow of immediate and important problems. See Frederick 
Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law,? 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006); FREDERICK SCHAUER 
& RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, The Trouble with Cases, in REGULATION VS. LITIGATION: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 45 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011). 
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many other opponents of hate speech laws describe the object of 
such laws as the desire on the part of government to suppress that 
with which it disagrees or that with which people take offense.16 
By contrast, most proponents of hate speech laws describe the 
object of such laws as the prevention of harm.17 In the face of this 
important terminological and substantive difference about how to 
characterize the consequences of racial insults, endorsements of 
sexual violence, and Holocaust denials, for example, an initial and 
necessary question is thus the very nature of such consequences, 
a question whose empirical dimensions cannot be avoided.18 
Consider, for example, Weinstein’s claim that imposing tax 
laws on those who disagree with the taxes is legitimate only if 
those who object to such laws have the opportunity to articulate 
their objections.19 But suppose, quite realistically,20 that there 
exists a highly secret algorithm employed by the Internal Revenue 
Service to determine whom to audit, the possession of which 
would enable taxpayers with almost complete certainty to avoid 
detection for plainly unlawful tax avoidance. Under such 
circumstances, would a prohibition on disclosing the algorithm—
a prohibition on aiding and abetting unlawful tax avoidance—
eliminate or diminish the obligation of those who disagreed with 
the tax to comply?21 If not, then the only relevant distinction 
 
 16. Weinstein, supra note 4, at 527. 
 17. See, for example, most of the contribution in SPEECH AND HARM: 
CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012). 
On harm and free speech more generally, see Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First 
Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81. 
 18. To observe that there are empirical questions about the nature of the harms 
caused by hate speech is not to deny that there are also conceptual questions. For example, 
the emotional and psychological consequences of a race-based insult directed at an 
individual are different in kind (putting aside questions of degree) from race-based 
incitements to violence, discrimination, and other forms of independently unlawful 
activity. See Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635 
(1993); Schauer, supra note 17. 
 19. Weinstein, supra note 4, at 530. 
 20. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 159–
67 (2003). 
 21. For purposes of the example, nothing turns on whether the prohibition targets 
only IRS employees or others who might be in possession of such information. As a matter 
of existing First Amendment doctrine, publication of unlawfully obtained information by 
one who was not a participant in the original illegality is protected. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 
532 U.S. 514 (2001); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). But even if the 
prohibition in my hypothetical example extended to everyone in possession of the 
algorithm, it is difficult to see how this would affect the obligation of citizens to pay their 
taxes. 
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between this example and the hate speech scenario is an alleged 
closer empirical connection between this form of aiding and 
abetting tax avoidance and the act of actual tax avoidance than 
there is between facilitating, causing or constituting racial or 
ethnic or religious or sexual orientation discrimination by words 
and the actual practice of such discrimination. But whether there 
is such a difference is exactly the matter in issue, and thus it is 
question-begging to assume at the outset that hate speech is 
neither harmful in itself or of lesser consequence than the verbal 
aiding and abetting of conventional criminal activity. If hate 
speech just is an act of racial (or other unlawful) discrimination,22 
or if it is as causally connected with unlawful acts of discrimination 
as publishing the IRS algorithm is with unlawful tax evasion, then 
it is hard to see why the demands of legitimacy require permitting 
the objector to engage in the very practice that is prohibited, 
which is the point of the tax evasion example. Now it may be that 
there are important differences between the two examples, but 
those differences need to be explained and justified, empirically 
as well as conceptually and normatively. And thus the tax evasion 
example serves as a caution against simply assuming at the outset 
that hate speech is not itself an act of discrimination or is not as 
closely causally connected with acts of discrimination as 
disclosure of the IRS algorithm is with tax evasion.23 And because 
this is not the forum for delving into these difficult empirical 
questions, I prefer to leave hate speech aside rather than to 
assume the answers to empirical questions about which the 
conceptual framing is complex and the data are at best 
inconclusive. 
 
 22. On the possibility that hate speech is constitutive rather than causal of 
discrimination, see RAE LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON 
PORNOGRAPHY AND OBJECTIFICATION (2009); CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY 
WORDS (1993). The claim is controversial, but does bear an interesting affinity with the 
conclusions about discrimination in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See 
Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 431. 
 23. Indeed, although it is often stated that government is suppressing opinions with 
which it disagrees, actual instances of suppression justified on such grounds are virtually 
non-existent. When government suppresses, it almost always claims that it is doing so to 
prevent some harm, and not just to suppress disagreement. Government may frequently 
be mistaken in that assessment, and it is important to discuss the soundness (or not) of 
such claims. But to assume at the outset that the basis for suppression is disagreement is to 
frame the issue in such a way as to avoid precisely such discussion. 
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III. 
Specific questions about hate speech aside, therefore, the 
question – or at least one question, and the one I address here – is 
whether the possession of a right to object to a regulatory law with 
which one disagrees will increase the likelihood that the 
disagreeing citizen will comply with the law despite her 
disagreement. This question is closely connected with the 
question of descriptive legitimacy as Weinstein articulates it, but 
is not identical to it, for reasons that are worth closer inspection. 
To repeat what was noted above, we are no longer in the 
realm of normative legitimacy. At least for the sake of argument, 
I will accept that allowing citizens to express their individual (as 
opposed to doing so through their representatives) disagreement 
with a law is a necessary condition for that law’s normative 
legitimacy, and thus for the citizen’s obligation to comply with 
that law just because it is a law. Such an assumption presupposes, 
pace the philosophical anarchists,24 that there are at least some 
laws that should be obeyed even in the face of first-order (or 
content-based) disagreement just because those laws are law. And 
if there are such laws—if the very fact of law independent of the 
content of the law provides a reason to obey it25—then the 
normative legitimacy question is whether the opportunity to 
object is a member of the set of necessary conditions for that law 
to generate an obligation to comply on the part of the subject who 
believes such a law morally or otherwise mistaken.26 My 
 
 24. See, e.g., CHAIM GANS, PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM AND POLITICAL 
DISOBEDIENCE (1992); ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970); A. 
JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979); A. JOHN 
SIMMONS, Philosophical Anarchism, in FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE: NEW 
PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 19 (John T. Sanders & Jan Narveson eds., 1996); M.B.E. 
Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973). 
 25. As maintained by a long line of thinkers, from Socrates to Locke to Rawls and 
beyond. See William Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEGAL 
THEORY 215 (2004); LESLIE GREEN, Law and Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002); GEORGE KLOSKO, The Moral Obligation to Obey the Law, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 511 (2012). 
 26. To put the same issue in different words, the question is about the identity of the 
properties that an official directive (perhaps calling it a “law” is question-begging) most 
possess in order for it to ground a content-independent (prima facie) obligation of 
compliance compliance. It is worth emphasizing that even the philosophical anarchist 
believes that there is an obligation to refrain from murder, sexual assault, theft, dangerous 
driving, and the like, but believes that this obligation arises from those acts being morally 
wrong independent of their legal prohibition. As a result, it is useful in isolating the issue 
to bear in mind the image of the person who believes that the law’s prohibitions or 
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assumption here is that freedom publicly to object is indeed one 
of those conditions, although, as discussed above, it is hardly self-
evident that such an assumption is warranted. 
With that assumption in hand, we can then turn from 
normative to descriptive legitimacy. But the question of 
descriptive legitimacy is not as straightforward as some, including 
Weinstein here, believe. Specifically, the descriptive question on 
which I focus is whether allowing objectors to object will increase 
the likelihood of compliance with the laws to which they object. 
Will those who disagree with a law find compliance “more 
acceptable” than they would absent an opportunity to participate 
in a decision that turned out to go against their preferences or 
their own considered judgments?27 But although this looks like 
one question, it is in fact three questions, and it will be valuable 
to attempt to distinguish them. 
The first question is the “wholesale” question whether 
people who live in a society in which dissent is permitted are more 
likely to believe that they have a moral obligation to obey the law 
than are people who live in a society in which dissent is restricted, 
controlling for all other possible differences. As with most other 
questions of comparative law, comparative political theory, and 
comparative public opinion, the presence of countless variables 
makes anything even approaching a conclusive answer virtually 
impossible. Still, and relying most on the research done by Tom 
Tyler and his collaborators on the relationship between a person’s 
sense of governmental legitimacy and her inclinations to obey 
laws and officials,28 we might conclude that the answer to this 
 
mandates are mistaken. If there is an obligation to obey the law qua law, then the subject 
who believes a law to be mistaken, whether as a matter of morality or policy or something 
else, would still have a (sanction-independent as well as content-independent) obligation 
to comply. 
 27. On the “more acceptable” framing, which is somewhat ambiguous about whether 
it refers to what people will think and what people will actually do, see AMY GUTMANN & 
DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 10 (2004). 
 28. See especially TOM R. TYLER. WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2d ed., 2006). See 
also Tyler, supra note 8; Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A 
Psychological Perspective, 29 NYU J. INT’L LAW & POLITICS 29 (1997); Tom R. Tyler, 
Beyond Self-Interest: Why People Obey Laws and Accept Judicial Decisions, THE 
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 44 (Fall 1998). Of special relevance is Tom R. Tyler, 
Understanding the Force of Law, 51 TULSA L. REV. 507 (2015), in which Tyler responds to 
the criticisms of some of his conclusions that I offered in FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE 
FORCE OF LAW (2015), and which I draw on here. This is not the place to continue my 
debate with Tyler, but it would be wrong to deny the existence of that debate or his 
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question is in the affirmative. Although Tyler’s indicia of 
governmental legitimacy do not explicitly include the kind of 
opportunity for public dissent that is at the heart of the question 
on the table in this Symposium and this Article, it is a reasonable 
extrapolation from the indicia that Tyler does include that people 
who live in a society in which the laws are made publicly and 
democratically, and in which people have the opportunity publicly 
to dissent from those laws with which they disagree, will be more 
likely to believe that there is a general obligation to obey laws 
with which they disagree than those who live in a society in which 
such earmarks of legitimacy are absent. 
Let us further assume an affirmative answer to this wholesale 
question. That is, let us assume that belief in a general obligation 
to obey the law will increase when people are allowed to object to 
the laws with which they disagree. But even if this is so, further 
questions remain. The second question, therefore, is whether 
people who believe in a general—abstract, or wholesale—
obligation to obey the law will feel a “retail” obligation to obey 
specific laws with which they disagree—specific laws whose 
content they find objectionable. And here the reliance on Tyler, 
including Weinstein’s, becomes more problematic. Because all 
but one of Tyler’s survey questions fail to distinguish between 
laws with which people agree from laws with which they disagree, 
he is able to conclude that the chief factor in determining belief in 
an obligation to obey a specific law is the moral content of that 
law.29 The moral desirability of a law is undoubtedly an important 
factor in explaining why people might believe that they should 
obey a law that disadvantages them personally, but it says little 
about people’s beliefs about laws they find mistaken, whether on 
moral or policy grounds.30 In the context of compliance issues 
generally, this might be only a minor problem, as there is good 
reason to be interested in the sanction-independent grounds for 
compliance with personally disadvantageous laws that people find 
generally desirable, including many of the laws about, for 
example, taxes and driving. But the free speech question arises 
 
disagreements—some conceptual and some empirical—with some of the arguments that I 
offer here. 
 29. See Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 28, at 224; 
Tyler, Beyond Self-Interest, supra note 28, at 45. 
 30. Tyler’s research is explicitly and carefully criticized on precisely these grounds in 
LESLIE GREEN, Who Believes in Political Obligation?, in FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE 
1, 10–24 (John T. Sanders & Jan Narveson eds., 1996). 
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explicitly in the context of disagreements about the content of our 
laws, and the claim I am addressing is that those who object to a 
law—and not just those who are disadvantaged by a law to which 
they do not in the abstract object—will be more likely to comply 
when they have been afforded an opportunity to object to the 
passage or enforcement of that law. And on this question, the 
conflation of the moral and the legal is of determinative 
importance. If people profess to be willing without the necessity 
of sanction to comply with laws whose content they find morally 
agreeable, then it is hard to see why giving them an opportunity 
to object to such laws will have any effect on the degree of their 
willingness to comply. 
Although this problem affects and infects the ability to infer 
a belief in the willingness to comply with an objectionable law 
from a willingness to comply with laws that subjects find morally 
desirable, Tyler’s research does include one question focused on 
the professed willingness of people to comply with laws whose 
content they find objectionable.31 And here he similarly finds that 
people claim to be more willing to comply with such objectionable 
(to them) laws if they have been made under conditions of 
procedural legitimacy.32 Again. Tyler does not explicitly include 
freedom to object publicly within his set of conditions, but he 
comes close by including citizen input within his definition of 
legitimacy, and thus Weinstein’s extrapolation seems entirely 
reasonable. Accordingly, we might conclude from Weinstein’s 
gloss on Tyler’s research that people profess to have a greater 
willingness to comply with laws with which they disagree when 
they have been given an opportunity to express that disagreement 
publicly than when such disagreement is in some way restricted or 
prohibited. This is the question of free speech and legitimacy as 
applied to particular laws, and now we are much closer to 
addressing the precise question that I consider here, that 
Meiklejohn, Dworkin, Post, and others have addressed implicitly, 
and that Weinstein here addresses most directly and explicitly. 
Thus, it appears from Tyler’s research to be the case that giving 
people an opportunity to object to laws with which they disagree 
 
 31. TYLER, supra note 28, at 46. 
 32. With respect to this question, Tyler does not appear to exclude the fear of 
sanctions, and thus the answers to this question may not be as supportive of his general 
program and conclusions as he believes. But this is a side issue on the free speech question, 
so I will say no more about it here. 
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will not only increase their belief in the legitimacy of the system 
as a whole, and not only increase their belief in the legitimacy of 
laws that that system has made, but will also increase their belief 
in an obligation to obey even those particular laws they find 
objectionable.33 
It is at this point, however, that Tyler’s survey research, and 
Weinstein’s reliance on it, stops short of answering the ultimate 
question—will people who claim to believe in the obligation to 
obey laws with which they disagree, and who in fact believe that 
they have an obligation to obey such laws, actually obey such laws. 
And here we must confront the distinction between what people 
believe they ought to do and what they actually do. I believe, for 
example, that I ought to lose weight, but in the face of bacon-
inspired temptation my genuine beliefs give way. Similarly, we 
ought to be interested in whether people who believe they ought 
to follow laws with which they disagree will in fact follow them 
when the “temptation” to disobey is present, a temptation that 
will occur with considerable frequency within the set of laws that 
people find objectionable. If we are now focused on laws with 
which people disagree, it should come as little surprise that such 
laws will often present for people situations in which the law says 
one thing and their own all-things-except-the-law-considered 
judgment says something else. There is less research on this 
question than we might wish, and this is not the occasion to delve 
into it, in part because I have done so previously and elsewhere.34 
But even if people believe that there is an obligation to obey those 
laws with which they disagree, it should be no more surprising that 
this abstract belief is under-reflected in actual practice than there 
is that the abstract belief in the desirability of weight loss is under-
reflected in actual practice. 
 
 33. Defenders of (some) hate-speech regulations could (and do) argue that 
restrictions on invective, epithets, insults, and the like would not interfere with the ability 
of people to object to laws in more civil terms. This is a more than plausible response to 
Weinstein and others, but a plausible rejoinder is that the response presupposes too much 
of a distinction between the propositional content of an objection and the style or language 
in which the objection is couched. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Resolving 
this genuine dispute is not germane to my principal point in this Article, so I will do no 
more than note it here, and note that a Cohen-inspired conflation between content and 
style may need more justification and explanation than is typically found in much of the 
literature objecting to hate-speech laws. 
 34. See SCHAUER, supra note 28, at 57–74, 197–205. 
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  This is not to say that the claims about the relationship 
between an opportunity to object and the incidence of compliance 
have been falsified. It is only to say that they have not been 
established, and that the research that might be understood to 
establish them turns out not to do so. The question of descriptive 
or sociological legitimacy is important, but we must distinguish a 
description of belief from a description of behavior. Even if it is 
the case that freedom of speech increases the degree of belief in 
the legitimacy of law, and belief in the obligation to obey 
disagreeable laws, on the question of whether freedom of speech 
increases actual compliance with laws with which people disagree, 
the best we can do is simply to say that we do not know. 
IV. 
The relationship between a regime of freedom of speech and 
political legitimacy is important, even more important—or at least 
more pervasive—than the question of hate speech. The larger 
issue is the soundness of what we might label the “due process” 
argument for freedom of speech. Just as most developed legal 
traditions consider it a requirement of procedural justice that 
those who are to be punished or otherwise sanctioned by the legal 
system have an opportunity to speak on their own behalf prior to 
the imposition of the sanction—we call it procedural due process 
in the United States, and the English refer to audi alteram partem 
(hear the other side) as a fundamental principal of natural 
justice35—so too might we generalize from this to the possibility 
that something analogous to due process grounds the right to 
speak out against even a general law before one is bound by the 
force of the state to obey it. 
In considering the legitimacy based due process argument for 
freedom of speech, Weinstein has valuably advanced the inquiry 
by urging us in considering this question to distinguish between 
normative and descriptive/sociological legitimacy. But once we do 
address the vital topic of descriptive legitimacy, we see that there 
is a difference between the empirical fact of a belief in legitimacy 
and the empirical fact of the behavior that might flow from such a 
belief. Because theorists from Meiklejohn to Weinstein have 
supplemented their broader normative claims with more or less 
 
 35. See Frederick Schauer, English Natural Justice and American Due Process, 18 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 47 (1976). 
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specific empirical claims that one justification for freedom of 
speech is that it will increase the degree of sanction-independent 
legal compliance with laws with which people disagree, this 
Symposium has seemed the ideal occasion to address that 
particular claim. The claim is interesting and important, and, if 
sound, would provide another foundation for a democracy-
focused account of freedom of speech. But at the moment we have 
little basis for believing it sound, even if it were good were it to be 
so. 
